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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, thirteen foster care children in Washington State sued the 
state, the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), and the 
Secretary of DSHS.1 The lead plaintiff, twelve-year old Jessica Braam, 
had been placed in thirty-four different foster homes by the time the law-
suit was filed.2 Other plaintiffs included children who had been moved to 
numerous homes, placed in inappropriate and unsafe care, denied neces-
sary mental health treatment, and separated from their siblings.3 The 
class grew to include foster children who had experienced or who were at 
risk of experiencing three or more placements.4 
These plaintiffs claimed that the State’s practices violated the chil-
dren’s substantive due process rights to be free from unreasonable risk of 
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 1. Columbia Legal Services, Braam 101, BRAAM KIDS (Sept. 2007), braamkids.org/552.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Fifth Amended Complaint at 1–8, Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851 (Wash. 2003) 
(No. 98 2 01570 1). Other harm suffered by plaintiff-children included children placed with known 
child molesters, children inappropriately placed in drug rehab with adult addicts and in inappropriate 
mental facilities, children sleeping on the floors of DSHS offices because they were without place-
ment, and children placed with parents who, unaware of and unable to care for the child’s behavioral 
issues, responded inappropriately, such as twisting one child’s nipples until they bled and making 
him eat hot peppers. Id. 
 4. Braam, 81 P.3d at 855. 
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harm. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs,5 and 
after mediation subsequent to that decision, the parties entered into a 
consent decree that is still in force today.6 A consent decree is a court 
decree that all parties agree to.7 The terms in a consent decree are bind-
ing on the parties and are fully enforceable by the court.8 Through a con-
sent decree, the parties in Braam created an oversight panel that was to 
be responsible for monitoring progress throughout the life of the decree.9 
The Braam panel continuously monitored the decree, and on Octo-
ber 31, 2011, it was modified and extended by twenty-six months.10 The 
modified decree recognizes that although the State of Washington, 
DSHS, and the Children’s Administration have made significant pro-
gress, additional foster care system reform is needed and continued court 
oversight is the correct method to reform the foster care system.11 The 
Braam settlement is an example of court oversight resulting from a con-
sent decree entered into between plaintiffs—a large class of foster chil-
dren—and a child welfare agency. Litigation and the agreement have 
spanned over a decade but have significantly and positively impacted the 
child welfare system in Washington State.12 
As of June 2011, twenty-one child welfare consent decrees were in 
place, operating in sixteen different states.13 An additional seven states 
                                                 
 5. Id. at 865 (holding that “foster children have substantive due process rights to be free of 
unreasonable risk of harm, and a right to reasonable safety” and that “[a]lleged violations of that 
right will be measured on the professional judgment standard”). 
 6. Braam 101, supra note 1. 
 7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (9th ed. 2009). 
 8. AMY KOSANOVICH & RACHEL MOLLY JOSEPH, CHILD WELFARE CONSENT DECREES: 
ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE COURT ACTIONS FROM 1995 TO 2005 2 (Child Welfare League of Amer-
ica 2005). Consent decrees usually arise out of a class action lawsuit and are often the goal of institu-
tional reform litigation. Many subjects and classes of underrepresented and underserved populations 
use litigation and consent decrees to achieve social change. 
 9. COLUMBIA LEGAL SERV., THE BRAAM IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: FURTHERING LEGISLATIVE 
MANDATES (2007), available at http://braamkids.org/552.html. The decree established six main 
focus areas: 1) placement stability, 2) mental health, 3) foster parent training and information, 4) 
unsafe and inappropriate placements, 5) sibling separation, and 6) services to adolescents. Id. 
 10. Braam Settlement Agreement, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVICES, 
http://www.dshs.wa.gov/ca/about/imp_settlement.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Historically, prison reform has also used institutional reform litigation giving rise to con-
sent decrees to require local governments to change prison conditions such as overcrowding. See, 
e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992). 
 13. KAI GUTERMAN, CONSENT DECREE MATRIX 2 (Casey Family Programs 2011). The states 
currently operating under a court consent decree include: Arizona, Connecticut, the District of Co-
lumbia, Georgia, Illinois (three cases), Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, 
New York City (four cases), Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas. 
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were engaged in litigation likely to give rise to consent decrees.14 Most 
decrees that have been active over the last two decades have addressed 
states’ failures to properly train and license foster parents; place children 
in adequate and safe foster and group homes; properly report, investigate, 
and address abuse and neglect incidents; provide needed medical, dental, 
and mental health services to foster children; ensure adequate parent-
child or sibling visitation; ensure social workers have manageable case-
loads, training, and supervision; and provide children and families with 
adequate case planning and review.15 
Between 1995 and 2005, eleven states successfully complied with 
the terms of consent decrees governing their respective child welfare 
agencies, and thus those decrees were dismissed.16 Many of those states 
enacted legislation or policies as a result of the decrees, and some con-
tinue to have advisory groups monitor the child welfare agencies’ activi-
ties.17 In other states, decrees have been modified because of partial 
compliance by the state or state agency.18 Further still, some states made 
significant changes to their child welfare systems even though no settle-
ment or consent decree was entered.19 Increased awareness and account-
ability are collateral goals of institutional reform actions; in this regard, 
institutional reform litigation brought some deficiencies to the surface 
even when no consent decree was entered into. As shown by the large 
number of existing decrees that govern states and the outcomes they 
eventually obtain, class action lawsuits can effectuate large-scale system-
ic change for child welfare systems. Plaintiffs in these cases use the court 
system as an avenue for social change, asking the courts to bind states, 
state agencies, and local officials to commitments for positive change 
affecting the lives of children. 
Yet, in a period of recession, state budget crises, and a conservative 
court system, consent decrees in child welfare systems are under attack. 
Most notably, the United States Supreme Court has diminished the effec-
tiveness of consent decrees by placing concerns for states’ rights above 
                                                 
 14. Id. Those states and counties currently in litigation include: California, Los Angeles Coun-
ty, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Texas. 
 15. KOSANOVICH & JOSEPH, supra note 8, at 5. 
 16. Id. The states that successfully exited their consent decrees include: Arkansas, Florida, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, and North 
Carolina. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 6; see also Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851 (Wash. 2003). 
 19. KOSANOVICH & JOSEPH, supra note 8, at 7 (citing Foster Care Reform Litigation Docket, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW (2000), http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/fc_docket/ 
alpha/all_cases_printout/). 
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the statutory and constitutional violations that result in harm to children. 
In a recent decision, Horne v. Flores,20 the Court demanded a broader 
and more flexible application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 
60(b)(5). In doing so, the Court opened the door for states to seek relief 
from court-enforced agreements like consent decrees. This decision un-
dermines the use of institutional reform litigation as a means of fixing the 
child welfare system and thus deals a further blow to the nation’s most 
vulnerable citizens. 
This Note will discuss Horne’s impact on consent decrees stem-
ming from institutional reform litigation in child welfare. Part II will ex-
plore the history of Rule 60 as it applies to final judgments, and specifi-
cally consent decrees. Additionally, Part II discusses the Supreme 
Court’s application of Rule 60(b)(5) in Horne. Part III will critique the 
Court’s decision for providing a more flexible standard that weighs fed-
eralism concerns above the merits of the case. Part IV discusses the im-
portance of consent decrees in child welfare and proposes suggestions for 
their ongoing use to be effective. Finally, Part V provides a brief conclu-
sion. 
II. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(B)(5) AND HORNE V. FLORES 
Due to the sanctity of final judgments, Rule 60 is unique because it 
allows for the modification or vacation of a final judgment. The rule is 
designed to remove the uncertainties and limitations of ancient remedies 
while preserving all of the various kinds of relief that those remedies af-
forded. This Note first discusses the plain language of the rule. This 
analysis is followed by an account of Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County 
Jail,21 the leading case before Horne to dictate what standard is to be 
used when courts decide a Rule 60(b)(5) motion. Lastly, this Part dis-
cusses the majority’s holding in Horne. As the current Supreme Court is 
growing increasingly hostile to the use of institutional reform litigation 
and continued court oversight, the Horne case has provided an additional 
avenue for defendants to get out from under a judgment. 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) 
Rule 60(b)(5) attempts to strike a proper balance between the con-
flicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that jus-
                                                 
 20. 557 U.S. 433 (2009). 
 21. 502 U.S. 367 (1992). 
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tice must be done.22 In general, Rule 60 regulates the procedures by 
which a party may obtain relief from a final judgment.23 Specifically, 
Section (b)(5) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding if the judgment has been satisfied; if it is 
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or if ap-
plying it prospectively is no longer equitable.24 
Additionally, the rule provides that a party may ask a court to va-
cate or modify a judgment or order if a “significant change either in fac-
tual conditions or in law” renders continued enforcement “detrimental to 
the public interest.”25 The party seeking relief bears the burden of estab-
lishing that changed circumstances warrant relief.26 Once the party car-
ries that burden, a court abuses its discretion when it refuses to modify an 
injunction or consent decree in light of such changes.27 
B. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail 
Before Horne, the leading case involving the appropriate standard 
for reopening, modifying, or setting aside a judgment on the ground that 
“applying it prospectively is no longer equitable” was Rufo v. Inmates of 
Suffolk County Jail.28 While Rufo established a flexible standard, the 
Court held that “it does not follow that a modification will be warranted 
in all circumstances . . . . [A party may obtain relief when it is no longer 
equitable,] not when it is no longer convenient to live with the terms of a 
consent decree.”29 Furthermore, the Rufo court established that 
“[m]odification of a consent decree may be warranted when changed 
factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more 
                                                 
 22. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE §2851 (2d. ed. 1995).  
 23. Id. 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). 
 25. Horne, 557 U.S. at 447 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997)). 
 28. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 367. In this institutional reform litigation case, the government was seek-
ing to modify a consent decree that required reform of a constitutionally deficient jail. Among the 
requirements in the decree, the jail had to provide single occupancy cells for pretrial detainees. The 
petitioner sheriff moved to modify the decree to allow double bunking in a certain number of cells 
because of a significant increase in the number of incarcerated persons. Id.; see also 12 JOSEPH T. 
MCLAUGHLIN, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.47 (2)(a) (2001). 
 29. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383. Additionally, the court found: 
A consent decree must of course be modified if, as it later turns out, one or more of the obliga-
tions placed upon the parties has become impermissible under federal law. But modification of 
a consent decree may be warranted when the statutory or decisional law has changed to make 
legal what the decree was designed to prevent. 
Id. at 388. However, this aspect of the rule is not at issue here. 
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onerous” or when “a decree proves to be unworkable because of unfore-
seen obstacles . . . or when enforcement of the decree without modifica-
tion would be detrimental to the public interest.”30 
Once a moving party has met its burden of establishing a change in 
fact or law warranting modification of a consent decree, the analysis 
shifts, and the “district court should determine whether the proposed 
modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.”31 Regard-
ing this step of the analysis, the Rufo Court warns that a modification 
must not create nor perpetuate a constitutional violation.32 Additionally, a 
consent decree is a final judgment that may be reopened only to the ex-
tent that equity requires; therefore, a proposed modification should not 
rewrite a consent decree so that it merely conforms to the constitutional 
floor.33 
Next, the Court recognized the financial and political limitations of 
local governments, but also highlighted the strong public interest(s) often 
present in impact litigation34 cases. For example, the Court recognized 
that state and local officers in charge of institutional litigation may agree 
to do more than what is required by the Constitution to settle a case and 
avoid further litigation, but a court should keep the public interest in 
mind when ruling on a request to modify.35 Additionally, the Court legit-
imated government concerns surrounding financial constraints, but also 
noted that “[f]inancial constraints may not be used to justify the creation 
or perpetuation of constitutional violations.”36 In conclusion, the Rufo 
Court held that “[u]nder the flexible standard we adopt today, a party 
seeking modification of a consent decree must establish that a significant 
change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the pro-
                                                 
 30. Id. at 384. In addition, the court found that litigants are not required to anticipate every 
exigency that could arise during the life of a consent decree; however, modification should not be 
granted where a party relies upon events that actually were anticipated at the time it entered into a 
decree. Id. at 385. 
 31. Id. at 391. 
 32. Id. In Rufo, petitioners argued that double bunking inmates would be constitutional. Re-
spondents countered that double bunking at the new jail would violate the constitutional rights of 
pretrial detainees. The Court remanded, concluding that the modification should not be granted if the 
reviewing court finds double bunking unconstitutional. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. In this context, impact litigation refers to the use of the court system to obtain relief for 
groups of people or to change entire systems through litigation. Attorneys who engage in impact 
litigation strategically bring cases to obtain systemic relief, instead of relief just for their clients. For 
example, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) often engages in impact litigation. 
 35. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 392. 
 36. Id. at 392–93. 
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posed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.”37 In 
Horne, the Court used this flexible approach when determining whether 
the lower federal courts abused their discretion when denying the peti-
tioners’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion to vacate the standing injunction.38 
C. Horne v. Flores 
In 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Horne v. Flores to 
revisit the issue of when defendants could obtain relief from final judg-
ments under Rule 60(b)(5). In Horne, English Language Learner (ELL) 
students in the Nogales Unified School District (Nogales) and their par-
ents filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the state of Arizona was 
violating the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) by failing to 
take appropriate action to overcome language barriers.39 In 2000, the 
case finally went to trial, and the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Arizona concluded that defendants violated the EEOA because the 
amount of funding the state allocated for the special needs of ELL stu-
dents was “arbitrary and not related to the actual funding needed to cover 
the costs of ELL instruction in Nogales.”40 As a result, the Court entered 
a declaratory judgment with respect to Nogales, and in 2001, the judg-
ment was extended to apply to the entire state.41 Defendants did not ap-
peal the district court’s order.42 
After the final judgment, petitioners repeatedly sought relief from 
the district court’s orders, on the basis that subsequent legislative acts 
warranted relief from the consent decree, but to no avail.43 The timeline 
after the 2000 injunction was as follows. First, in 2006, the Arizona Leg-
islature passed House Bill (HB) 2064, which increased ELL funding.44 In 
light of the passage of HB 2064, the legislators and superintendent, as 
                                                 
 37. Id. at 393. It is important to note that the Rufo Court developed this flexible standard for 
when a party seeks to modify a consent decree. In contrast, in Horne, the petitioners were motioning 
to vacate an agreement in its entirety. 
 38. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009). 
 39. Flores v. State, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2000); Equal Education Opportunities 
Act of 1974 (EEOA), 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f). The relevant portion of the EEOA states: “No State shall 
deny equal education opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or nation-
al origin, by . . . (f) the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome lan-
guage barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs.” Id. 
 40. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 441 (2009); see also Flores, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
 41. Flores v. State, No. CIV. 92–596TUCACM, 2001 WL 1028369 (D. Ariz. June 25, 2001). 
 42. Horne, 557 U.S. at 441. 
 43. Id. at 439. 
 44. Id. at 442. HB 2064 was designed to implement a permanent funding solution to the prob-
lems identified by the district court in 2000. Id. HB 2064 was implemented after Arizona acquired 
multiple fines from the district court—up to two million dollars per day—after the court found Ari-
zona in contempt for failing to appropriately fund the ELL program as mandated by the court. Id. 
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new petitioners, moved to purge the contempt order; in the alternative, 
they moved for relief under Rule 60(b)(5). The district court denied the 
motion.45 The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and re-
manded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Rule 60(b)(5) 
relief was warranted.46 
On remand, the district court denied the motion because the funding 
was still insufficient. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that 
the progress made did not warrant relief because petitioners had not 
shown that there were no longer incremental costs associated with ELL 
programs in Arizona, or alternatively, that Arizona had altered its fund-
ing model.47 Additionally, the court rejected the argument that the en-
actment of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001 constituted a 
changed legal circumstance that warranted Rule 60(b)(5) relief.48 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a state’s obligation under the 
EEOA and the nature of the inquiry that is required when parties seek 
relief under Rule 60(b)(5).49 
The Court looked extensively at the burdens of institutional reform 
litigation on a state and its systems, specifically the education system. 
First, the Court noted that injunctions often remain in force for many 
years, and the passage of time frequently brings about changed circum-
stances. These changed circumstances may include changes in the nature 
of the underlying problem, changes in the governing law or its interpreta-
tion by the courts, or new policy insights that warrant reexamination of 
the original judgment.50 Second, the Court held that institutional reform 
injunctions often raise sensitive federalism concerns and can involve are-
as of core state responsibility, such as public education.51 Finally, the 
                                                 
 45. Id. at 443–44. The district court found that HB 2064 was flawed for three reasons: 1) $80 
student increase was not rationally related to effective ELL programming; 2) two-year limit on fund-
ing for each ELL student was irrational; and 3) HB 2064 violated federal law by using federal funds 
to “supplant” rather than “supplement” state funds. Id. at 444. 
 46. Id. at 444. The Ninth Circuit remanded because the district court did not initially address 
petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(5) claim that changed circumstances rendered continued enforcement of the 
original declaratory judgment order inequitable. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Flores v. Arizona, 516 F.3d 1140, 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 49. Horne, 557 U.S. at 445. 
 50. Id. at 448. 
 51. Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) (“recogniz[ing] that local autonomy 
of school districts is a vital national tradition, and that a district court must strive to restore state and 
local authorities to the control of a school system operating in compliance with the Constitution”)). 
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Court reiterated that federalism concerns are heightened when a federal 
court decree affects state or local budget priorities.52 
The Court further held that the dynamics of institutional reform liti-
gation differ from those of other cases. Public officials sometimes con-
sent to or refrain from opposing decrees that go beyond what is required 
by federal law.53 Additionally, injunctions of this sort bind state and local 
officials to the policy preferences of their predecessors and may thereby 
improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and 
executive powers. Moreover, overbroad or outdated consent decrees can 
limit officials’ abilities to respond and fulfill their duties.54 Finally, the 
Court reiterated that in the past, the Supreme Court has held that courts 
must take a “flexible approach” to Rule 60(b)(5) motions addressing 
such decrees.55 Therefore, federal court decrees exceed appropriate limits 
if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate federal 
law or does not flow from such a violation.56 
Applying the facts of Horne, the Court found that the lower courts 
used a heightened standard that paid insufficient attention to federalism 
concerns. Rather than inquiring broadly into whether changed conditions 
in Nogales provided evidence of an ELL program that complied with the 
EEOA, the district court focused solely on whether increased ELL fund-
ing complied with the original declaratory judgment order.57 Similarly, 
the Supreme Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for focusing on the de-
fendants’ failure to appeal the original 2000 order, rather than evaluating 
the Rule 60 motion based on Rufo. The Court’s analysis asked only 
whether a change in factual conditions or in law renders continued en-
forcement of the judgment detrimental to the public interest.58 In reality, 
Rule 60(b)(5) contains a disjunctive “or,” and that satisfaction of an ear-
lier judgment is one of the enumerated bases for relief, but not the only 
basis for relief.59 The Court added that the EEOA leaves state and local 
educational authorities a substantial amount of latitude in choosing how 
                                                 
 52. Id. The Court held that “[s]tates and local governments have limited funds. When a federal 
court orders that money be appropriated for one program, the effect is often to take funds away from 
other important programs.” Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 450; see also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 (1992). 
 56. Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977)). 
 57. Id. at 450. 
 58. Id. at 453. 
 59. Id. at 454 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) (“[T]he court may relieve a party . . . [if] the 
judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been 
reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.”) (emphasis added)). 
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their court-ordered obligation is met.60 Finally, the Court concluded that 
the district court erred by asking only whether petitioners had satisfied 
the original declaratory judgment through increased funding, thereby 
abusing its discretion.61 
In conclusion, the Horne Court held that the lower courts misper-
ceived both the nature of the obligation imposed by the EEOA and the 
breadth of the inquiry called for under Rule 60(b)(5). The Court remand-
ed for a proper examination of at least four important factual and legal 
changes that may warrant granting relief from the judgment: Arizona’s 
adoption of a new ELL instructional methodology,62 Congress’s enact-
ment of NCLB,63 structural and management reforms in Nogales,64 and 
increased overall education funding.65 
III. CRITIQUE 
The dissent drew principal conclusions to undermine the majority’s 
conclusion that the district court only considered the amount of funding 
                                                 
 60. Id. at 454–55 (citing Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981) (“We think Con-
gress’ use of the less specific term, ‘appropriate action,’ rather than ‘bilingual education,’ indicates 
that Congress intended to leave state and local authorities a substantial amount of latitude in choos-
ing the programs and techniques they would use to meet their obligations under the EEOA.”)). 
 61. Id. at 455. 
 62. See id. at 460–61. ELL instruction in Nogales changed in 2003 from instruction based 
primarily on bilingual education to a “structured English immersion” (SEI) approach. The Court 
found there to be documented evidence that SEI is a better approach and that through HB 2064, the 
legislature created an Arizona English language learners task force. On remand, the Court ordered 
that all of this evidence be considered to decide if it constitutes a significantly changed circumstance 
that warrants relief. Id. 
 63. Id. at 461–62. Petitioners argue that through compliance with NCLB, the state has estab-
lished compliance with the EEOA because the Federal Department of Education approved Arizona’s 
plan. Petitioners argue that this is evidence that the state has taken appropriate action to overcome 
language barriers within the meaning of the EEOA. Id. 
 64. Id. at 465–66. Structural and management reforms in Nogales, including reduced class 
sizes, improved teacher quality, and uniform textbook and curriculum planning (among other 
things), were implemented by then Superintendent Kelt Cooper. Id. The Supreme Court found that 
their import was not recognized by the Ninth Circuit or the district court. Finally, the Court found 
that, “[e]ntrenched in the framework of incremental funding, both courts refused to consider that 
Nogales could be taking ‘appropriate action’ to address language barriers even without having satis-
fied the original order.” Id. 
 65. Id. at 468–69. The original judgment noted five sources of funding that collectively fi-
nanced education in the state: state’s base level funding, ELL incremental funding, federal grants, 
regular district and county taxes, and special voter-approved taxes. Id. at 468. “All five sources have 
notably increased since 2000.” Id. The Supreme Court found the Ninth Circuit in clear legal error 
when they found that it was not an appropriate step for the petitioners to take funding out of other 
programs and put it into ELL programs. Id. at 469. The Supreme Court noted that the EEOA does 
not require any particular level of funding, and it does not require it to come from any specific 
source. Id. Additionally, the EEOA does not give the federal courts authority to judge whether a 
state is providing appropriate instruction in other subjects. Id. 
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when evaluating the Rule 60 motion.66 First, the dissent concluded that 
“the Rule 60(b)(5) ‘changes’ upon which the district court focused in-
cluded the ‘changed teaching methods’ and the ‘changed administrative 
systems’ that the Court criticize[d] the district court for ignoring.”67 In 
this same regard, contrary to the majority’s differing assertions, the lower 
courts did examine structural and management reforms in Nogales when 
evaluating the 60(b)(5) motion.68 Similarly, on remand, the majority 
wanted the district court to examine whether compliance with the NCLB 
substitutes as compliance with the EEOA.69 However, neither party ever 
argued that the district court should take account of the types of changes 
proposed by the majority, and therefore the district court did not commit 
legal error.70 Finally, the Court suggested that the lower courts did not 
properly examine an overall increase in the education funding available 
in Nogales.71 Again, Justice Breyer adamantly questioned the majority’s 
characterization of the district court’s analysis as clear legal error; he 
argued that, in reality, the district court reviewed the increased funding, 
but the majority disagreed with its conclusion.72 
                                                 
 66. Id. at 456. 
 67. Id. at 482–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For example, the dissent emphatically pointed out 
that two of the eight days of evidentiary hearings were devoted to the State’s claim that focused on 
the adoption of the new English Immersion programming. Id. at 498–99. The district court recog-
nized the advances and acknowledged that the state had taken steps, but that many of the new stand-
ards were still evolving and it would be premature to make an assessment of some of these changes. 
Id. at 499 (citing Flores v. Arizona, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160 (2007)). Additionally, in his dissent, 
Justice Breyer hypothesized that perhaps the majority did not mean to suggest that the lower courts 
failed to examine these changes, but that they came to the wrong conclusion. Id. at 500. This judg-
ment included a host of fact-related inquiries that warranted deference to the district court. Id. 
 68. Id. at 504–05 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority disagreed with the district 
court’s conclusion and once again, that the Court failed to give deference to the district court’s fact-
related judgments). 
 69. Id. at 501 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit “that because of signifi-
cant differences in the two statutory schemes, compliance with NCLB will not necessarily constitute 
‘appropriate action’ under the EEOA”). 
 70. Id. at 501–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority suggested that the lower courts wrongly 
failed to take account of four other ways in which the new Act is significant: 1) its prompting signif-
icant structural and programming changes; 2) its increases in federal funding; 3) its assessment and 
reporting requirements; and 4) its shift in federal education policy. Id. at 463–64 (citing majority 
opinion). However, the Court fails to follow the principle that it only reviews the district court’s 
decision for an abuse of discretion. A reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the 
district court. Id. at at 501–03. The dissent argues that where, as here, entitlement to relief depends 
heavily on fact-related determinations, deference should be accorded to the district court, and the 
power to review the district court’s decision should seldom be called into action unless the Rule 60 
standard appears to have been grossly misapplied. Id. (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 
U.S. 474, 490–91 (1951)). 
 71. Id. at 509 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. “The question here is whether the State has shown that its new funding program 
amounts to a ‘change’ that satisfies subsection (f)’s [of the EEOA] requirement. The District Court 
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The majority and dissent agreed that Rufo’s flexible standard for re-
lief applies; however, the action in Rufo was for a modification and not a 
setting aside of a judgment.73 According to Moore’s Federal Practice,74 
courts normally only set aside a judgment if the moving party shows that 
the decree has served its purpose, and there is no longer any need for the 
injunction.75 For example, on other occasions, the Supreme Court has 
held that “[a] decree may be changed upon an appropriate showing, and 
it may not be changed . . . if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated 
in the decree . . . have not been fully achieved.”76 Furthermore, the Court 
said nothing about the well-established principle that to have a decree set 
aside entirely, a moving party must show both (1) that the decree’s ob-
jects have been attained and (2) that it is unlikely, in the absence of the 
decree, that the unlawful acts it prohibited will occur again.77 For propo-
nents of institutional reform litigation, one of the biggest concerns sur-
rounding the Horne decision is the fact that the Court did not focus on 
whether the constitutional violations had been remedied. 
Accordingly, petitioners failed to show that the decree’s objectives 
had been attained. For example, in 2000, the district court found that the 
state’s minimum funding level for ELL programs was “arbitrary and ca-
pricious” and bore no “rational relation” to the actual funding needed to 
insure that ELL students could achieve academic standards.78 Seven 
years later, the same district court held that “circumstances in this regard 
remain the same. The moving parties have not shown compliance with 
the court’s decree, much less changed circumstances that would warrant 
modification or dissolution of this court’s order.”79 In that case, petition-
                                                                                                             
found it did not. Nothing this Court says casts doubt on the legal validity of that conclusion.” Id. at 
510. 
 73. Id. at 488 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 74. 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.47(2)(c) (3d ed. 2009). 
 75. Horne, 557 U.S. at 491–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority did not apply 
this distinction, but instead criticized the Ninth Circuit when it referred to situations in which chang-
es justified setting an unsatisfied judgment entirely aside as likely rare). 
 76. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (quoting United 
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968) (ordering the district court, on remand, 
to determine whether the school board has acted in good faith and whether the vestiges of past dis-
crimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable, thereby rendering the judgment unneces-
sary)). 
 77. Horne, 557 U.S. at 49–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 
442 (2003)); see also Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247 (holding that if the school district was being operated 
in compliance with the commands of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
if it was unlikely that the school would return to its former ways, the desegregation litigation would 
be deemed fully achieved). 
 78. Flores v. State, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1167 (D. Ariz. 2007); see also Flores v. State, 172 F. 
Supp. 2d 1225 (D. Ariz. 2000). 
 79. Flores, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1167. 
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ers attempted to demonstrate that the judgment had been satisfied 
through HB 2064 as evidence of new methods and funding,80 but the dis-
trict court concluded that HB 2064 violated federal law because it took 
into consideration federal funds and attempted to “supplant” funds that 
the state would otherwise provide.81 In conclusion, the district court held 
that the “changed circumstances” that petitioners put forth—i.e. in-
creased funding from HB 2064—failed to comply with the “appropriate 
action” requirement of Section (f) of the EEOA.82 
Whether or not the district court considered the appropriate factors, 
it held that Arizona had not complied with the court’s decree. In this 
manner, the Horne majority allowed for re-litigation of previously liti-
gated matters. First, the petitioners did not appeal earlier judgments. Se-
cond, a party cannot use Rule 60 to attack the reasoning underlying the 
original judgment or to show that the facts as they were then did not jus-
tify the order.83 The majority charged the district court with a flawed un-
derstanding of what constituted compliance, but “[t]he original judgment 
rested upon a finding that the State had failed to provide Nogales with 
adequate funding ‘resources’. . . in violation of Subsection (f)’s ‘appro-
priate action’ requirement.”84 When the majority suggested that petition-
ers may comply despite lack of rational funding, it impermissibly put the 
burden back on the original plaintiff (now respondent) or the court to 
reestablish what has once been decided.85 
Because Horne operated under the auspice of Rufo, yet failed to fo-
cus on the merits of the claim or recognize that this was not a motion 
solely for modification, the quasi-new, more flexible standard that re-
mains is confusing. It is unclear to what extent and how courts will inter-
                                                 
 80. Id. at 1165. 
 81. Id. at 1166. Additionally, the district court found that HB 2064 imposes an impermissible 
two-year limitation on funding for ELL instruction. Id. 
 82. Id.; see also Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126, 164 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that “under 
Horne and earlier Supreme Court decisions, a motion to vacate, such as defendants have filed here, 
requires the Court to determine whether the ‘objective’ of the court orders has been attained”). If 
there is an argument between Horne and Rufo or Frew, the Supreme Court did not acknowledge it. 
Evans, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 166. Similarly, the second part of the test to determine the likelihood in 
the absence of the decree that the unlawful acts it prohibited will again occur was not discussed in 
the Evans opinion. In this regard, the burden should be on the petitioners to show that they will not 
violate the EEOA again. There is nothing in the majority or dissent opinions of the Horne case that 
discusses this issue. Perhaps this is a question of fact and the district court did not get to the second 
part of this analysis after finding that the first part of the analysis—that the decree’s objectives have 
been attained—was not satisfied. 
 83. See Horne, 557 U.S. 433, 493 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Browder v. Dep’t of Corr. of 
Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978). 
 84. Horne, 557 U.S. at 493 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. 
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pret this new standard. Undoubtedly, critics will read the majority’s deci-
sion as hostile to institutional reform litigation and as a potential barrier 
for plaintiffs to use the courts to change state systems.86 This new set of 
rules creates the dangerous possibility that long final orders, judgments, 
and decrees will be unwarrantedly subject to perpetual challenge, offer-
ing defendants unjustifiable opportunities to endlessly re-litigate viola-
tions with the burden of proof imposed, once again, upon the plaintiffs.87 
IV. HORNE’S IMPACT ON CHILD WELFARE AND SUGGESTIONS 
[I]f the Court were to permit defendants to walk away from their 
obligations under the consent orders simply because there is a new 
administration that believes that all it needs to do is achieve the 
constitutional floor . . . that would mean that there would be no fu-
ture consent decrees involving governmental entities. Plaintiffs 
would have no incentive to enter into consent decrees if the next 
administration could force a retrial based on a claim that the consti-
tutional floor has now been met. While Horne may have provided 
parameters for court involvement in institutional reform litigation 
and consent decrees, it did not declare their demise.88 
Consent decrees and institutional reform litigation have historically 
and contemporaneously been used to effectuate change within child wel-
fare systems. This Part highlights two cases where the state attempted to 
use Horne as a vehicle for getting out from its respective consent decree. 
Then, after exploring the use of consent decrees in child welfare pre- and 
post-Horne, this Part proposes various suggestions for the ongoing and 
productive use of consent decrees and institutional reform litigation with-
in the context of child welfare. 
                                                 
 86. In Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 434–35 (2003), the Court unanimously held that the 
Eleventh Amendment permits a federal district court to enforce a consent decree against state offi-
cials seeking to bring the State into compliance with federal law. Any further discussion of this issue 
is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 87. Horne, 557 U.S. at 494; see also Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188, 2018 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (warning that the use of Rule 60(b)(5) could encourage litigants to burden the federal 
courts with a deluge of Rule 60(b)(5) motions premised on nothing more than the claim that the 
various judges or justices have stated that the law had changed and that this court eroded the institu-
tional integrity of the court). 
 88. Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126, 171 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying defendants’ motion to 
vacate the consent decree after residents of an institution for persons with developmental disabilities 
brought class action against the District of Columbia, alleging they received constitutionally defi-
cient care, treatment, education, and training). 
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A. Post-Horne Child Welfare Cases 
1. L.J. v. Wilbon 
In the first case, the city of Baltimore attempted to use Horne to get 
out from under a consent decree almost immediately after they entered 
into the decree. In L.J. v. Wilbon,89 a class of foster children in the care 
and custody of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services 
(BCDSS) brought a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against BCDSS alleging mismanagement of the foster care program that 
resulted in children suffering physical abuse, sexual abuse, medical ne-
glect, and otherwise being subjected to dangerous living conditions.90 In 
2009, the parties reached a final agreement on the entered consent de-
cree; however, shortly thereafter, Horne was decided and appellants 
asked the court to allow briefing on the potential applicability of the Su-
preme Court’s decision.91 Appellants alleged that Horne stood for the 
proposition that a court may not enforce a consent decree based on a 
statute that does not provide a private cause of action. The district court 
rejected this interpretation and found that, because there remains a con-
cern about violations of federal law, there is a federal interest that is not 
inappropriate to enforce, even if these particular plaintiffs lacked a pri-
vate right of action.92 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that Horne did 
not establish a change in the law sufficient to support appellant’s 
60(b)(5) motion, but that “[a]t most, Horne reinforced the well-
established principle that private plaintiffs cannot bring a claim to en-
force a statute that lacks a private right of action.”93 While the defendants 
filed a petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari, calling into question 
the circuit split that has emerged after Horne when evaluating Rule 
60(b)(5) motions based on a change in law, the petition was denied.94 
                                                 
 89. 633 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 90. Id. at 299. 
 91. Id. at 303. 
 92. Id. at 304. 
 93. Id. at 307. The Fourth Circuit also discussed Rule 60(c), which requires that a motion for 
relief under Rule 60(b)(5) be made within a reasonable period of time. This provision was complete-
ly disregarded by the Horne court. In Wilbon, the court noted that Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 
(1992), the case in which the moving party relied on as a change in law warranting relief, was decid-
ed more than eighteen years ago. Wilbon, 633 F.3d at 307–08. Therefore, the court concluded that 
“even if Suter had indeed changed the law, [a]ppellants’ lengthy delay in filing a motion based upon 
it would bring into question the appropriateness of equitable relief.” Id. at 308. 
 94. Dallas v. L.J., 132 S. Ct. 757 (2011), sub nom. L.J. v. . For example, the Fourth Circuit 
applied a “dead fish” standard; in this regard, to obtain relief based on an intervening change in law, 
an earlier decision in the case must have been dead wrong. Wilbon, 633 F.3d at 311. This is in con-
trast to the approach taken by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, which considered whether changes in 
 
1542 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1527 
2. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Fenty 
In the second case, the District of Columbia (D.C.) attempted to get 
out from under their consent decree despite the horrendous state of their 
foster care system. In LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Fenty,95 the district 
court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate a consent decree that the 
parties entered into in 1991.96 The decree was entered into because of 
statutory and constitutional violations in the administration of the Dis-
trict’s foster care system. These allegations included the failure to initiate 
timely investigations into reports of abuse and neglect, failure to provide 
services to families, failure to place children in appropriate homes, fail-
ure to develop case plans, and failure to move children into situations of 
permanency.97 In 2010, appellants brought an action to dismiss the con-
sent decree for a variety of reasons, including structural changes, eco-
nomic hardship, statutory compliance, and good faith compliance for a 
reasonable period of time.98 
First, the court distinguished Horne by finding that the appellants 
mentioned structural changes without discussing actual impacts or alleg-
ing new policy insights. In contrast, in Horne the movants provided de-
tailed descriptions of the state’s implementation of ELL.99 In addition, 
the court held that the costs of monitoring are not considered obstacles or 
changed circumstances.100 Under statutory compliance, appellants con-
tended that they are in substantial compliance with certain areas such as 
case planning, timely investigations, placements, adoptions, and system 
infrastructure; however, the court concluded that based on the evidence 
provided, the appellants were not in full statutory compliance to warrant 
complete relief.101 Finally, as a result of the District’s refusal to abide by 
provisions of the stipulated order, the court found that the appellants had 
not maintained a period of good faith compliance.102 
Based on these findings, the court concluded that while the Dis-
trict’s child welfare system had improved drastically, defendants had yet 
to deliver a fully satisfactory child welfare system.103 The D.C. Circuit 
                                                                                                             
the law have altered the status of the underlying federal rights supporting the decree. Similarly, these 
courts took a more flexible approach, which the moving party argued was proper. 
 95. 701 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 96. See LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991). 
 97. Id. at 960. 
 98. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 99. Id. at 101. 
 100. Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 512 U.S. 203, 216 (1997)). 
 101. LaShawn A., 701 F. Supp. at 102–10. 
 102. Id. at 110. 
 103. Id. at 116. 
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found no error in the district court’s decision and affirmed, finding the 
request for termination premature in light of the discovery in 2008 of 
“the decomposing bodies of four girls who received no help from” the 
child welfare system.104 Defendants did not appeal. 
In both cases, the Horne decision affected the defendants’ actions. 
In Wilbon, the parties reached a final agreement that both sides believed 
was “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interest of the plaintiff 
class” in June 2009.105 Shortly thereafter, the appellants moved to vacate 
the decree based on the Horne decision and brought a Rule 60(b)(5) mo-
tion.106 In other words, both parties were ready and willing to engage in 
modifications to a long-standing and necessary consent decree. The only 
reason appellants sought to vacate the consent decree was because of the 
Horne decision. The appellees brought the original action in 1988 be-
cause children in Baltimore’s mismanaged foster care program experi-
enced physical and sexual abuse, medical neglect, and were otherwise 
subjected to dangerous living conditions.107 In this regard, the appellants 
never alleged that the decree should be vacated because the above listed 
concerns had been addressed or that the decree was no longer neces-
sary.108 It is hard to reconcile the appellant’s desire to vacate the consent 
decree when the original reasons behind the decree remained an ongoing 
problem. Moreover, arguments based on state budget concerns lose va-
lidity when money being spent fighting and re-litigating orders could be 
used to make positive changes for children instead. 
Similarly, in LaShawn A., the moving party was concerned with 
terminating court oversight rather than the state of their child welfare 
system. First, both the district court and the D.C. Circuit referenced the 
four decomposing bodies found as recently as 2008. Even someone 
without a background in child welfare can understand the implications 
that such a discovery has with regard to the state of a welfare system. 
Secondly, at the time that the District of Columbia moved for removal of 
the decree, the Attorney General of the District of Columbia was on a 
rampage to end court oversight.109 In 2010, the District of Columbia was 
                                                 
 104. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Gray, 412 F. App’x. 315, 316 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 105. L.J. v. Wilbon, 633 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 300. 
 108. Id. at 312 n.5 (noting that the option of seeking to have the decree vacated on the basis of 
compliance also remains available to appellants; however, in September 2009, appellants reported 
data that showed several ongoing compliance problems). 
 109. Mike DeBonis, Getting the Courts to Stop Governing D.C., WASHINGTON CITY PAPER, 
(Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/38334/getting-the-courts-to-stop-
governing-dc.  
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held accountable under six different consent decrees.110 When the Rule 
60(b)(5) motion was brought to end court oversight of the child welfare 
system, Attorney General Peter Nickles was more concerned about sepa-
ration of powers than ensuring the best and safest outcomes for the chil-
dren going through the District of Columbia’s child welfare system. In a 
D.C. newspaper, Nickles commented, “I think I’m preaching a message 
here, . . . I believe not only in separation of powers when it comes to the 
power of the executive versus the power of the legislature . . . but also 
vis-à-vis the judiciary.”111 Additionally, Nickles responded that he was 
absolutely trying to forestall a new generation of lawyers from attempt-
ing to take over city and state agencies.112 Nickles was criticized for his 
attempt to use the Horne decision to get out from under the LaShawn 
consent decree. For example, of the ten consent decrees entered into be-
tween child welfare systems and the group Children’s Rights, Nickles’ 
government was the only one using Horne to get out from its decree. As 
the lawyer for Children’s Rights commented, “In all of our other cases, 
the defendants are trying to do what they were supposed to do[.]”113 
Besides the two cases highlighted above, Rule 60(b)(5) motions 
have been brought in other districts that have long-standing consent de-
crees within their child welfare systems. For example, in Juan F. v. 
Rell,114 plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Children and Families 
failed to place children with their siblings, meet the basic needs of chil-
dren in the foster care system, or have an adequate number of foster 
homes, in addition to many other constitutional and statutory viola-
                                                 
 110. Id. Attorney General Peter Nickles and his administration have taken action concerning 
some of the other consent decrees. First, the longest-standing Dixon decree concerned the treatment 
of the mentally ill. In 2009, a Rule 60(b)(5) motion was brought to dismiss the decree. As recently as 
September 2011, a federal judge approved a settlement agreement between the District and the Dix-
on plaintiffs. See D.C. Dep’t of Mental Health, Dixon Case, http://dmh.dc.gov/node/222782 (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2013). Next, the Nickles administration attempted to use Horne to get out from under 
a consent decree governing services for the developmentally disabled. This is now embodied in 
Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2010); see also supra note 88. Relief was denied. The 
third decree, entered into in 1985, concerned the handling of youth offenders. Most recently embod-
ied as District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 717 A.2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2000), it does not appear that any 
action has been taken by Nickles to overturn this decree. In the final two decrees, governing the 
District’s delivery of special education and subsequently, the busing needs that stem from such edu-
cation, litigation is ongoing (which Nickles is a part of), but it does not appear that Nickles has 
brought a Rule 60(b)(5) motion to get out from either decree. See Blackman v. District of Columbia, 
633 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Petties v. District of Columbia, 779 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 111. DeBonis, supra note 109. 
 112. Id. Other plaintiffs’ attorneys criticized Nickles for exerting so much energy towards 
undoing consent decrees when he is only delaying changes and coinciding with the idea that the 
District should just meet the conditions of the consent decree and then get out. 
 113. Id. (quoting Marcia Robinson Lowry). 
 114. No. 3:89–CV–859, 2010 WL 5590094 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2010). 
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tions.115 Defendants brought an action in 2010 claiming that relief was 
warranted under Rule 60 because they achieved substantial compliance 
over the past two decades, including the passage of several federal child 
welfare laws. They also raised federalism concerns and argued that 
Horne has significantly altered the Rule 60(b)(5) standard.116 Most sig-
nificantly, the court rejected the moving party’s broad interpretation of 
Horne. The court found that Horne did not call into question a district 
court’s authority to enforce a validly entered consent decree negotiated 
by the parties and that it did not turn Rule 60(b)(5) motions into vehicles 
to re-litigate the original claim.117 The court concluded that the decree 
will not end until the state has fully met its responsibilities in addressing 
the needs of these children.118 
B. Suggestions 
This section highlights why consent decrees are necessary and sug-
gests ways to improve them to effectuate more positive change. That be-
ing said, it is important to understand that consent decrees are a way to 
reform, rather than abolish, the child welfare system. The child welfare 
system is full of children of color who have been uprooted from their 
parents, families, and communities at a disproportionate rate to white 
children and in lieu of providing these families with the money and ser-
vices they need.119 Abolishing the child welfare system would have to 
                                                 
 115. Id. at *1. 
 116. Id. at *2–3. 
 117. Id. at *3. In terms of the other arguments put forth by defendants, the court first found that 
the defendants’ substantial compliance would not hold up. Not only were the defendants aware of 
what was required of them because of their ongoing participation in the consent decree, the Supreme 
Court has required that if changed circumstances are to form the basis for a court’s decision to va-
cate a decree, those changes must have been unforeseen; they were not unforeseen here because of 
defendants’ heavy involvement in drafting the decree. Id. Next, the court found that the child welfare 
laws generally promote and do not hinder the objectives of the decree; therefore, they do not consti-
tute changed legal circumstances. Id. Third, the court dismissed the defendants’ claim that federal-
ism concerns warrant relief because of the decree’s impact on the state budget. Id. The court con-
cluded that the state’s spending was required by the state’s constitutional and statutory obligations to 
the children in its care. Id. 
 118. Id. at *4. 
 119. The disproportionate number of children of color going through the child welfare system 
is due to the relationship between slavery, poverty, motherhood, the prison industrial complex, and 
child welfare, which is beyond the scope of this article. For more information on these topics see 
Patricia Allard, Crime, Punishment, and Economic Violence, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE THE INCITE! 
ANTHOLOGY 157, 157 (Incite! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2006); Ellen M. Barry, Par-
ents in Prison, Children in Crisis, in OUTSIDERS WITHIN 59, 64 (Jane Jeong Trenka, Julia Chinyere 
Oparah & Sun Yung Shin eds., 2006); Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of 
Motherhood, 1 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (1993); Dorothy E. Roberts, Adoption Myths, in 
OUTSIDERS WITHIN 49, 50 (Jane Jeong Trenka, Julia Chinyere Oparah & Sun Yung Shin eds., 
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extend beyond the confines of the law and into the work of future gen-
erations. In contrast, consent decrees are important now as they can 
change the daily and often-inhumane conditions for children. In this re-
gard, Horne was a blow to efforts to reform and abolish the child welfare 
system. If plaintiffs do not use the courts and litigation as an avenue for 
social change, what other means do they have to reform the current sys-
tem?120 
One answer to this question is that individual plaintiffs could bring 
individual claims seeking money damages, relief from their current situa-
tions, or both. However, there are problems with this option. First, chil-
dren are one of the most voiceless and vulnerable classes in society, and 
foster children are even more vulnerable as wards of the state. Access to 
attorneys and the court system would be unrealistic, timely, and costly. 
The burden to attorneys, the court system, and children is unfathomable 
                                                                                                             
2006); Dorothy E. Roberts, Feminism, Race, and Adoption Policy, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE THE 
INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 42, 44 (Incite! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2006). 
 120. See CHARLES L. USHER ET. AL., MEASURING PERFORMANCE IN CHILD WELFARE: 
SECONDARY EFFECTS OF SUCCESS, FAMILY FOSTER CARE IN THE NEXT CENTURY 30 (Child Welfare 
League of America, 2001). The authors note: 
At the state and local level, efforts to bring about change have come in three forms: (1) 
consent decrees; (2) reform initiatives embarked on by governors, child welfare leaders, 
and other stakeholders; and, (3) demonstration programs authorized by waivers of federal 
regulations based on Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, under which state out-of-care-
home programs obtain federal funding. 
Id. The initiatives under prong two take time and are politically motivated. Initiatives like this 
can supplement, rather than supplant, consent decrees. The political arena cannot be trusted or 
expected to initiate its own reforms in a time when states are dramatically cutting their budgets, 
and areas such as child welfare are taking the brunt of these cuts. In terms of prong three, Fed-
eral IV-E waivers have had success. See CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, THE NEED TO 
REAUTHORIZE AND EXPAND TITLE IV-E WAIVERS (May 2010), available at 
http://www.casey.org/Resources/Publications/NeedForWaivers.htm. Through Title IV-E, the 
federal government spends more than $12 billion on foster care each year, which comprises 
approximately half of what states spend on foster care. Currently, IV-E funding is only allowed 
to maintain eligible children in foster care, but it has the potential to do more. Through IV-E 
waivers, certain states have been able to use these funds more flexibly to support community 
and home-based support programs that support vulnerable children in their parents’ homes. 
Title IV-E is not a capped program, but is directly related to the number of children in the child 
welfare system; therefore, if the number of children in care goes down, so does a state’s IV-E 
funding. Flexible waivers allow states to try additional methods, and in the five states where 
waivers are currently approved, the number of children in care has decreased. However, these 
waivers are experimental, and not all states have had positive outcomes or used their funds 
appropriately. In conclusion, IV-E waivers are one option of an experimental funding mecha-
nism that should continue; however, they cannot replace the current practice of using consent 
decrees to instigate change. Title IV-E waivers focus heavily on the relationship between states 
and the federal government and on funding, whereas the courts are in a better position to look 
at the bigger picture. Courts can look at what services and outcomes a specific community 
needs and incorporate IV-E waivers, their funding, and the experimental programs into the 
consent decrees it issues. Id. 
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and impossible. It is unclear who would pay for attorney services, and 
the financial burden on the state as the defendant could be greater than 
the financial burden of consent decrees on local budgets. 
Secondly, and most importantly, relief for children would have to 
be remedial. Claims could only be brought once harm had been done. 
One of the biggest advantages of class action consent decrees is that they 
become certified to protect all children currently in foster care and those 
that will be similarly situated in the future by creating a better child wel-
fare system.121 
A second alternative would be to make the entire child welfare sys-
tem less adversarial. Currently, termination122 and dependency123 hear-
ings involve lawyers on both sides; the state is represented by its own 
attorneys who are well versed in this type of juvenile litigation, and in 
response, birth parents retain their own attorneys.124 In some states and in 
some proceedings,125 children are also entitled to representation; howev-
er, in many states children are simply represented by a community volun-
teer known as a Court Appointed Special Advocate, a guardian ad litem, 
or their interests are not represented at all.126 If the system became less 
                                                 
 121. See, e.g., Braam ex rel. Bram v. State, 81 P.3d 851 (Wash. 2003) (certified class consisted 
of thirteen foster children and thousands of other children who had been moved to three or more 
homes while in the state’s custody). 
 122. Termination is when a parent’s rights are being permanently terminated. WASH. REV. 
CODE § 13.34.132 (2011). 
 123. Dependency hearings occur when a child is deemed to need protective services or some 
other protection or services from the state. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.040 (2011). 
 124. See e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.090 (2000) (allowing for parental representation and 
requiring appointment of an attorney in the case of indigent parents). For an interesting discussion of 
parens patriae—the concept that the state acts as a “parent” to children in its custody—see Jennifer 
K. Smith, Putting Children Last: How Washington Has Failed to Protect the Dependent Child’s Best 
Interest in Visitation, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 769 (2009). Parens patriae creates an ethical dilemma 
for attorneys and courts because what is presumed to be in the child’s best interest may not align 
with the child’s wishes. 
 125. For example, in Washington children twelve years of age and older are given the option of 
having their own attorney. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(6)(a) (2010) (a child shall be notified 
on his or her twelfth birthday of the right to counsel). 
 126. See e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100 (2010); see also In Re the Dependency of MSR 
& TSR, 271 P.3d 234 (Wash. 2012) (children have a fundamental due process interest that must be 
protected in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings). While a child’s right to counsel in termina-
tion and dependency hearings is beyond the scope of this Note, one possible safeguard that will 
decrease the need for consent decrees is providing all children with representation. If an attorney 
were looking out for the best interest of a child, certain safeguards would be put in place that could 
help prevent constitutional and statutory violations in the future. For example, attorneys could help 
ensure that siblings remain together and that a child is not moved from home to home. While it is not 
the responsibility of individual attorneys to do the job of state-run child welfare agencies, having an 
attorney become responsible for looking out for individual children will positively impact the entire 
child welfare system. Currently, only twelve states require the appointment of an attorney for all 
children. See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN CHILD 
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adversarial to the extent that lawyers were not needed at all, then the ar-
gument for consent decrees would be significantly weakened because it 
would not make sense to have lawyers play such a dominant role in a 
system they were excluded from for all other relevant purposes; howev-
er, it is highly unlikely that the child welfare system will ever become 
less adversarial because each party’s interests are too high. Most im-
portantly, a parent’s right to custody of their child is a fundamental right 
that can only be taken away if the state meets the highest burden of strict 
scrutiny.127 It is unlikely that parents will ever choose to fight for the cus-
tody of their child(ren) without representation. Similarly, the interest of 
the state is admittedly very high. The state’s interest is one of safety for 
its minor citizens. Safety is always an important state interest. Addition-
ally, the state is advantaged because its lawyers are well versed in the 
specific state laws that govern dependency and termination proceedings. 
Of course there are other alternatives than those that I have listed, but 
they all come with their own disadvantages.128 Ideally, litigation, which 
is admittedly timely and costly, will not be necessary in the future; but 
presently there is no better alternative that would make such a deep im-
pact on child welfare systems. 
Returning to consent decrees, there are ways to ensure more suc-
cessful approaches to litigation and multi-decade consent decrees that 
actually make continuous changes. In many ways, identifying the prob-
lem is the easy part of litigation; identifying the appropriate remedy is 
more difficult.129 Despite challenges, there are ways that courts and par-
ties can be creative and generate effective consent decrees with opera-
tional guidelines that lead to positive outcomes. One of the main prob-
lems with consent decrees and similar judgments stemming from institu-
tional reform litigation is that they last for long periods of time when 
most changes tend to come at the beginning. Oftentimes, the litigating 
attorneys on both sides have moved on, the original plaintiffs may have 
“aged out” of foster care, the politics of the state have inevitably 
                                                                                                             
ABUSE AND NEGLECT PROCEEDING: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2011), available at 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/represent.pdf (introduction revised 
May 2012). The Children’s Law Center in Washington D.C. illustrates a good example of how this 
could work. At the Children’s Law Center, pro-bono and staff attorneys represent children in custo-
dy cases when their family stability is jeopardized. They also provide free counsel to grandparents, 
foster parents, and other relatives who wish to obtain guardianship or custody of children trapped in 
the child welfare system. The center also strives to change laws and policies in D.C. based on the 
need they see when representing foster children. 
 127. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1971). 
 128. A more complete list of alternatives is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 129. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (identifying school segregation as 
an evil that needed to be remedied, but requiring further discussion of appropriate remedies). 
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changed, and the passion that was behind the litigation may have dissi-
pated. 
There are multiple ways to combat this. First, many consent decrees 
or judgments now have exit plans in place that monitor timelines and 
ensure things will be re-evaluated to see if certain markers have been 
met.130 Timelines can be tailored to be as realistic and expedient as pos-
sible. Secondly, many times consent decrees and judgments give rise to 
panels or monitors who are not lawyers, but experts in the field appoint-
ed by the court and agreed upon by the parties, resulting in continued 
oversight with less direct court involvement.131 For example, as a result 
of the Braam consent decree in Washington State, the Braam panel was 
created and it continues to monitor the progress of DSHS.132 The Braam 
Oversight Panel is a five-member panel of child welfare experts and ad-
vocates from across the nation. It monitors improvements in selected 
services for foster children that are provided by DSHS.133 Since the orig-
inal decree was entered into, the panel has played a constant and major 
role in the ongoing monitoring of Washington’s child welfare system. 
Additionally, the panel publishes regular reports and evaluations of out-
comes. In October of 2011, the decree was re-evaluated and extended. 
The attorneys and leaders on both sides of the litigation are able to work 
with the panel, comprised of non-attorneys, to reach the best outcomes 
for the state, plaintiffs, and all foster children. As a result there is contin-
ued oversight, but less direct court involvement. One of the main criti-
cisms of court involvement is the lack of experience and expertise on 
behalf of judges who implement the decrees. As a supplemented ap-
proach, a panel, such as the Braam Oversight Panel, calls for continued 
oversight but by national experts in the field of child welfare. Washing-
ton’s system still requires reform, but much progress has been made.134 
Finally, parties can work together to make a lot of changes at the 
beginning. All parties involved desire speedy outcomes; on the one side, 
the sooner progress is made, the sooner violations against children will 
be stopped. Conversely, the sooner the decree or judgment is satisfied, 
the sooner the court’s enforcement can end, which frees the state agency 
from the court’s orders.135 
                                                 
 130. See BRAAM PANEL, http://braampanel.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. The new decree details twenty-one, instead of the previous thirty-three, enforcea-
ble outcomes and continued oversight by the Panel. Id. 
 135. The impact of a judgment over time can be illustrated by school segregation cases. See, 
e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (remanding case to lower courts wherein de-
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A second suggestion to improve consent decrees in the child wel-
fare system is to create other mini-systems within the child welfare sys-
tem. For example, the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) was 
created as a result of LaShawn A.136 The mission of CFSA is to improve 
the safety, permanence, and well-being of abused and neglected children 
and to strengthen their families.137 CFSA takes and investigates reports, 
assists families, provides safe out-of-home care, and re-establishes per-
manent homes. Sub-agencies, like CFSA, can help monitor and strive for 
the outcomes determined in the consent decree. While this is not a per-
fect solution,138 it is one way to ensure ongoing implementation of those 
outcomes and best practices agreed upon by the parties. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the current Supreme Court is increasingly hostile to 
institutional reform litigation.139 Because the Court is heavily invested in 
the federalism debate and preserving states’ rights, Horne mandated a 
quasi-new, more flexible and confusing standard that left the door open 
for parties to seek relief from consent decrees.140 Coupled with the new 
Horne standard are other recent cases that could negatively impact all 
institutional reform litigation, including child welfare reform.141 Similar-
ly, during the current economic recession states are more reluctant to 
engage in lengthy litigation because of the time and high costs it produc-
es. Overall, child welfare consent decrees and similar judgments stem-
                                                                                                             
crees were created enjoining the public schools from segregating). Since the era of Brown, other 
schools and districts have been parties to consent decrees requiring desegregation. In all of these 
cases, desegregation has largely occurred, specifically with regard to de jure segregation. However, a 
lot of segregation and discrimination still takes place in public schools; once the original and main 
objective of the segregation decrees was met (e.g., desegregation), courts’ involvement decreased, 
and as a result, the last vestiges of discrimination and segregation remain. 
 136. LaShawn A. v. Fenty, NATIONAL CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/fc_docket/alpha/lashawnavwilliams/. 
 137. Who We Are, D.C. CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES AGENCY (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://cfsa.dc.gov/DC/CFSA/About+CFSA/Who+We+Are. 
 138. For example, even with the implementation of the CFSA, LaShawn A. is still an active 
consent decree because of D.C.’s failure to comply with the judgment. 
 139. See, e.g., Bruce A. Boyer & Amy E. Halbrook, Advocating for Children in Care in a 
Climate of Economic Recession: The Relationship Between Poverty and Child Maltreatment, 6 NW. 
J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 300, 315 (2011). 
 140. See supra Part II. One of the main concerns of the Supreme Court in Horne was the feder-
al government’s control over Arizona’s state budget. Horne v. Flores, U.S. 577 U.S. 433, 448 
(2009). 
 141. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (creating more barriers 
to class action certification). 
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ming from institutional reform litigation are in jeopardy and face signifi-
cant barriers. 
Most significantly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Horne v. Flo-
res placed federalism concerns above the merits of the case and did not 
give due deference to the district court’s findings that Arizona was still in 
violation of the EEOA. The Court’s decision has already led to increased 
litigation in the realm of child welfare, and the time and effort expunged 
on this new litigation has taken away from reform efforts aimed at keep-
ing vulnerable children safe and families together. Although lower courts 
have hesitated to grant post-Horne Rule 60(b)(5) motions to vacate ongo-
ing consent decrees, it is unclear how long this trend will last. Defend-
ants are attempting to read the Horne decision broadly and the confusing, 
new standard has resulted in circuit splits over how to interpret Horne.142 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has declined to revisit its decision and the 
appropriate standard to be applied when parties seek to use Rule 60 as a 
vehicle to vacate final judgments. Hopefully lower courts will continue 
to focus on the statutory and constitutional violations that are ongoing 
against children, and courts will not be so quick to vacate consent de-
crees that were initially agreed to by all parties. 
 
                                                 
 142. See L.J. v. Wilbon, 633 F.3d 297, 304 (4th Cir. 2011). 
